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On July 15, 1964, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) es-tablished the supremacy of European Community (EC) law.1 !is new norm had not been, nor was it meant to be, 
part of the Treaty of Rome. It was a judicial construct that would 
shape the relationship between member states and the EC for years 
to come. !e norm of supremacy established that “European law 
was supreme to national law; thus if [a national act] violated Eu-
ropean law, it would be illegal.”2 Italy, through its Constitutional 
Court, promptly opposed the norm. When the same case was ar-
gued before the Italian judges, the norm was explicitly rejected, a 
position further strengthened by subsequent cases.3
However, Italy’s stance did not remain unaltered. On June 8, 
1984, the Constitutional Court modified its jurisprudence, and in 
Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato it accepted the 
supremacy of EC law.4 !ough this marked an important step, the 
process was not complete. !e Court refused to rule that a national 
law conflicting with European law would be invalidated; rather, the 
law would simply be “disapplied.”5 !e shortcoming in the Court’s 
opinion was accounted for five years later when the Parliament 
passed the “communitarian” law (informally termed La Pergola).6 
!e act established that at the end of each calendar year, Parlia-
ment would automatically transpose EC directives and regulations 
into the domestic system. !e act represented the end of a process 
that turned the norm of supremacy from a judicial construction 
into a formal legislative mechanism that would directly transpose 
community legislation into the domestic system. !is study seeks 
to understand the factors that led Italy to accept the supremacy of 
European law. 
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Given the sui generis nature of the EC and its institutions, 
there is little doubt that Italy would have accepted the supremacy 
norm sooner or later. Nevertheless, while the outcome may be seen 
as pre-established, the specific reasons behind it, and more impor-
tantly, the timing of the internalization, are less clear. Why Italy 
accepted the norm when it did is an empirical puzzle worthy of 
attention. Additionally, Italy’s case is particularly interesting in light 
of its Constitutional Court’s explicit rejection of the norm two de-
cades earlier. !e reasons behind this diametric shift are thus of 
importance.  
Italy’s acceptance of EC law supremacy prompts the student 
of international relations to assess the theoretical significance of 
this event within the larger class of behavior to which it belongs, 
namely, cooperation among states. Accepting the supremacy of a 
body of law that is outside of the state constitutes a substantial 
relinquishment of national sovereignty. Understanding why and 
when states agree to limit their sovereignty in an international 
setting is an important task, especially in light of the growing rel-
evance of international organizations and agreements as the pre-
ferred means of interaction by states in the international system. 
Shedding light on this particular case may help explain other simi-
lar instances in the international context. Indeed, understanding 
why and when states agree to limit their sovereignty is a key com-
ponent of our knowledge of what cooperation is, and under what 
conditions it takes place.
!is study contends that Italy’s acceptance of the supremacy 
of EC law was the end result of a process that began at the end of 
the 1970s. !ree causal factors underpin the argument here ad-
vanced. First, the economic downturns produced by the 1979 oil 
crisis, and in particular high unemployment and high inflation, be-
came the primary issues to be confronted by Italian governmental 
elites. Second, due to this crisis, the Italian government was faced 
with general dissatisfaction with the national economy, and over-
whelming public support for further European integration. !ird, 
the ongoing integration process at the European level emphasized 
the economic benefits to be gained from a more cohesive and 
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aligned union, and that the harmonization and alignment of na-
tional laws was the sine qua non of an adequate integration process. 
!e convergence of these three dynamics led the Italian govern-
ment to accept the supremacy of EC law in an effort to eliminate 
the last major obstacle to the economic benefits that would alleviate 
the concerns of its population. 
!is argument draws some of its insights from the neofunc-
tionalist approach to the study of European integration. Neofunc-
tionalist accounts suggest, “the desire to obtain the full benefits of 
integration in the first area would lead to pressures for integration 
in a second linked area.”7 From that perspective, the Italian govern-
ment’s decision can be seen as an effort to obtain the benefits of the 
single market by integrating in another area: the European judicial 
realm to which the norm of supremacy belonged. !is is the only 
extent to which the argument advanced in this project resembles a 
neofunctionalist theory of European integration. 
!e argument also draws several insights from Geoffrey Gar-
rett’s functional theory of cooperation and institutional choice.8 
His emphasis on European states’ desire to solve their economic 
problems through enhanced integration is here replicated.9 In ad-
dition, his argument suggests that a dissatisfied electorate tends to 
influence political and economic decisions made by national gov-
ernments.10 However, as later sections will reveal, this theory also 
suffers from certain limitations that must be accounted for. 
!is study has many implications. By framing the adoption 
of supremacy as an internalization process, we can simplify the Eu-
ropean integration process with respect to one state—in this case 
Italy. When a norm becomes present, we are better able to evaluate 
and assess the nature of the causal processes that may have taken 
place. Second, by framing cooperation as a process of norm adop-
tion, this study sheds light on the dynamics that drive other kinds 
of cooperative arrangements among states. More precisely, coop-
eration between states may be a result of concerns about survival 
or about increasing capabilities.11 But it can also be an effort by 
countries that share the same norms and simply seek to advance 
them, whether they are political, economic, environmental, or legal 
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in nature.12 Finally, in developing a “two-level” explanation of norm 
internalization, which is what this author seeks to achieve, we are 
able to combine both aspects of the study of international politics, 
thus offering a more complete explanation. As Robert D. Putnam 
observes, “we need to move beyond the mere observation that do-
mestic factors influence international affairs and vice versa . . . to 
seek theories that integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas 
of entanglement between them.”13
"e paper is structured in three parts: Part I evaluates the 
existing literature on cooperation, with a focus on the socialization 
and norm literatures, in an effort to develop a testable argument. 
Part II provides empirical support for the argument advanced in 
Part I. Part III evaluates the empirical findings and concludes. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS: CONSTRUCTING A 
THEORY OF NORM INTERNALIZATION
The Dependent Variable
"e dependent variable of this study is norm internalization. 
"us, its purpose is to determine the process by which an inter-
national norm is adopted by a state, internalized, and then fully 
institutionalized. While it is possible to capture the same dynam-
ic by framing the dependent variable as institutional adaptation, 
scholars have suggested that the difference between “norms” and 
“institutions” may not be superficial.14 Indeed, “norm language can 
help to steer scholars toward looking inside social institutions and 
considering the components of social institutions.”15 
"e supremacy norm is characterized as international for two 
main reasons. First, it is international by nature. Supremacy was 
instituted by the European Court of Justice—a body that lies out-
side of the state system. Second, it is international in scope, for the 
norm seeks to regulate behavior among EC member states as well 
as between member states and EC institutions. 
Norm internalization varies on a continuum. Although at 
first this may seem counterintuitive—for a norm either does or 
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does not enter the domestic realm—the case of Italy suggests oth-
erwise. !e Italian Constitutional Court’s 1984 decision points to 
the fact that although norms may be internalized, sometimes this 
process is not completed. When the norm enters the domestic con-
text, but is not defined in the same way as it was when outside the 
state system, we can deem the norm only as partially internalized. 
Consequently, when domestic institutional actors act to ensure 
that the internalized norm reflects, both in form and in scope, the 
international norm, the process may be considered complete. !is 
operationalization is characterized by the fact that “international 
norms must always work their influence through the filter of do-
mestic structures and domestic norms, which can produce impor-
tant variations in compliance and interpretation of these norms.”16
In the case of Italy, prior to 1984 the domestic context had 
been characterized by a complete absence of the supremacy norm. 
!e court acted in 1984, but its reservations rendered the norm an 
inexact reflection of that which had been created by the European 
Court of Justice. In 1989, the parliamentarian act ensured that the 
ECJ’s doctrine was fully reflected in the Italian institutional system. 
Theoretical Frameworks
!e study of cooperation has elicited contributions from 
several schools of thought within the international relations and 
comparative politics literature. However, not all approaches have 
given it the attention it is due. Realists, for instance, have gener-
ally contended that international institutions have little impact on 
the international system, and that “they have no independent effect 
on state behavior.”17 John J. Mearsheimer defines institutions as “a 
set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooper-
ate and compete with each other.”18 His definition appropriately 
captures the scope of this paper, for these rules are “negotiated by 
states, and . . . they entail the mutual acceptance of higher norms, 
which are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obli-
gations.”19 Norms underpin the structure of institutions, and thus 
define the nature of the cooperation that is thereby derived. 
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However, Mearsheimer would contend that the cooperation 
that ensues is the product of a state’s self-interest, and that states 
abide by rule-shaping norms simply out of their own choice and 
not because they are obliged to do so.20 !is contention is hard 
to dispute, given the anarchic nature of the international system. 
However, the discussion does not end simply because there is 
agreement that the international system lacks a centralized enforce-
ment mechanism, and that states pursue their interests. Indeed, the 
choice driving states to embrace these rules may not be as free as 
Mearsheimer would have us believe. While he does refer to the ab-
sence of obligations on states deriving from without, his contention 
is incomplete, in that it ignores the presence of constraints deriv-
ing from within. !e argument advanced here suggests that Italy’s 
choice, while undeniably its own, was the result of political and 
economic pressures from within which, perhaps, made its choice 
less “free” than realist arguments might suggest. !us, while realist 
approaches may help us understand certain aspects of the system, 
they do not fully explain how those aspects affect state choices.
Within the field of European studies, neofunctionalism is 
the approach that tends to be directly associated with European 
integration.21 !e theory is rather complex and comprises several 
components. However, it is centered around the following tenets. 
First, interests drive national policy choices, and once the process of 
integration has begun, these interests remain constant. Second, de-
cisions about integration are taken without much knowledge and 
when deadlines are approaching. !ird, because of the close inter-
dependence of the different issues dealt with by integration, a step 
in one area will produce further steps in other areas too. Fourth, 
states are no longer the sole actors, but work side by side with bu-
reaucratic elites at the supranational level. Finally, the outcomes of 
integration are not fixed in advance, but rather, they are the “tran-
sient results of an on-going process.”22
!is paper borrows some insights from the neofunctional-
ist approach. In particular, I contend that the Italian government’s 
desire to curb unemployment and inflation was a relatively con-
stant interest throughout the decade from 1979–1989. !is does 
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not necessarily suggest, however, that these two issues would be 
the sole interests motivating Italy’s efforts toward future integra-
tion. "us, it is possible that once unemployment and inflation are 
accounted for, new issues may become part of the Italian agenda 
for integration. "e theory is also useful because it is possible to 
conceive of the decision to accept the supremacy of EC law as one 
“spillover” effect created by the movement toward the Single Euro-
pean Act (SEA) and the Economic Monetary Union (EMU). 
In spite of these similarities, neofunctionalism’s contention 
that decisions are taken without much knowledge of future con-
sequences is refuted by the empirical data. "e decision to accept 
the supremacy norm was a well-reasoned effort aimed at solving 
specific problems, and although it was made with an approaching 
deadline in sight, the consequences were predicted with a certain 
degree of confidence. Finally, while the integration process did show 
a notable increase in activity at the supranational bureaucratic level, 
Italy’s case demonstrates that the main causal factors driving the 
process were cast at the domestic level. "e population’s concerns 
with economic issues and how the government would respond to 
them were not particularly bureaucratic dynamics. 
In a study seeking to understand the process by which inter-
national norms are driven into the domestic context, theories of 
norm transition may be particularly insightful. Andrew P. Cortell 
and James W. Davis, Jr. argue that international norms are internal-
ized because of pressures exerted by domestic societal and political 
actors.23 "ey posit a causal link that emphasizes the process by 
which, “government officials and societal interest groups can appeal 
to international rules and norms to further their own interests in 
the domestic political arena.”24 "e process is thus internal to the 
state, and understanding its causes requires the analysis of domes-
tic factors.
Cortell and Davis propose two such factors that enable us to 
understand whether, “an international norm will influence state be-
havior: the domestic salience of the norm; and the domestic struc-
tural context within which the policy debate transpires.”25 "e 
domestic structural context factor is logically antecedent to the 
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salience of the norm. If the domestic structure is characterized by 
a centralized “decision-making authority,” then the internalization 
process is likely to be successful, regardless of the salience of the 
norm.26 However, in the more likely event that the domestic con-
text is more pluralist in nature, the “impact of government officials’ 
appeals on the state’s policy will depend on . . . the domestic salience 
of the international rule.”27 Domestic salience can then be detected 
by analyzing the “changes in the national discourse, the state’s insti-
tutions, and state policies.”28
"is argument is useful because, unlike realist accounts, it 
leads us to seek the domestic causes that drive a state’s choice to 
embrace certain rules of conduct. "e concept of salience is also 
considerably helpful. By narrowing down the universe of norms to 
only the salient ones, the argument adequately accounts for the fact 
that states pursue behavior that in some way advances their inter-
ests. However, this theory also requires that prior to being internal-
ized, the norm must be already perceived as salient; that is, only 
norms that have been salient for a certain amount of time will be 
invoked in the domestic context. "is is not unlikely, but did not 
occur in Italy’s case. "e norm of supremacy had not been part of 
the domestic discourse, and no societal or political actor had in-
voked it rhetorically. Indeed, when the Constitutional Court decid-
ed to establish the norm in the Italian legal system, its decision was 
perceived as a major turning point in its institutional approach.29 
Had the norm been salient, it is likely that the decision would have 
been less eventful. In addition, as will be shown later, the external 
integration process at the European level constituted an important 
factor in leading the Italian government to accept European law su-
premacy; the salience theory, although it highlights the importance 
of international norms, does not account for external processes that 
evolve over time. 
Norm embrace is not always merely the result of a state’s 
desire to achieve a certain objective: sometimes, it is the result of 
external pressure exerted by powerful hegemons.30 G. John Iken-
berry and Charles A. Kupchan approach the study of norms by 
framing it in terms of socialization. "e standard definition of so-
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cialization points to the “process of inducting actors into the norms 
and rules of a given community,” and Ikenberry and Kupchan 
particularly emphasize the induction aspect.31 !eir argument 
views socialization as, “an important element of power . . . exercised 
through a process . . . in which the norms and value orientations of 
leaders in secondary states change and more closely reflect those of 
the dominant state.”32 !e process is initiated when, “foreign elites 
buy into the hegemon’s vision of international order and accept it 
as their own—that is, when they internalize the norms and value 
orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative 
claims about the nature of the international system.”33 !is char-
acterization may be particularly useful if one were to view the EC’s 
context as one in which European institutions act as hegemons and 
member states as secondary actors. !is distinction is even more 
relevant given that Italy, although a founding member of the EC, is 
generally ranked as a second-tier state.34 
Ikenberry and Kupchan hypothesize that hegemonic social-
ization occurs under three circumstances. It is likely to follow pe-
riods of “wars and political crises, periods marked by international 
turmoil and restructuring [,] as well as the fragmentation of ruling 
coalitions and legitimacy crises at the domestic level.”35 Second, 
norms must gain support at the elite level within the state.36 Final-
ly, socialization is likely to come about “in the wake of the coercive 
exercise of power” by the hegemon, through the manipulation of 
material incentives.37
When applied to the Italian case, the theory of hegemonic so-
cialization is insightful in several respects. Beginning in 1981, and 
up until the fall of the First Republic in 1992, Italy was governed by 
a five-party coalition, the pentapartito. !us, coalitional fragmenta-
tion seems to have been a factor in the decade under examination. 
In addition, both the court’s 1984 decision and the passage of the 
law in 1989 can be seen as indicators of elites being receptive to 
the integration process and to the idea of supreme European law 
underpinning it. Finally, the integration process, with its emphasis 
on economic gains, and thus material incentives, may be seen as 
Europe’s hegemonic pressure being exerted on Italian elites. 
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However, while this may be the case, the EC did not use par-
ticularly coercive tactics, which is what hegemonic socialization re-
quires. !e argument also highlights the manipulation of material 
incentives as an important factor “inasmuch as it occurs primarily 
after war.”38 Obviously, this condition did not apply in the Italian 
case. Moreover, the examples Ikenberry and Kupchan cite as sup-
porting their argument all refer to one state’s efforts to socialize 
another state. However, Europe’s path toward integration involved 
the entire community, so while Italy may have been the most recep-
tive, it would be difficult to ascertain that it had been consciously 
singled out as the sole target. In sum, while a particularly insightful 
approach, hegemonic socialization lacks a certain degree of gener-
alizability that would make it applicable to instances of European 
integration.  
If hegemonic socialization is not entirely satisfactory, per-
haps the larger concept may better capture the phenomenon. Jef-
frey T. Checkel’s theory of European socialization includes most 
of the factors highlighted in hegemonic socialization.39 However, 
the account differs insofar as it differentiates between two specific 
kinds of socialization—a dichotomy that may prove useful in un-
derstanding the decision calculations of the Italian government. 
On one hand there is the kind of socialization where, “agents may 
behave appropriately by learning a role—acquiring the knowledge 
that enables them to act in accordance with expectations—irre-
spective of whether they like the role or agree with it.”40 In con-
trast, the second kind takes place when agents “go beyond role play-
ing and . . . accept community or organizational norms as ‘the right 
thing to do.’”41 
Although both seem plausible answers to the Italian ques-
tion, there are some limitations to their applicability. First, the ar-
gument suggests that it is not sufficient to show that agents “care-
fully calculate and seek to maximize given interests [by] adapting 
their behavior to the norms and rules favored by the international 
community.”42 Rather, the argument goes, we need to demonstrate 
that they “actively and reflectively internalize new understandings 
of appropriateness.”43 In doing so, the framework creates meth-
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odological barriers that are not easily overcome. !e analyst’s task 
becomes that of demonstrating, in an objective fashion, what the 
actors involved thought and believed at the moment they were act-
ing. !is is the ultimate goal of every social scientist; however, real-
ity shows that it is hardly ever attainable. 
!us, socialization dynamics, both hegemonic and appropri-
ateness-driven, are either incomplete or methodologically lacking. 
!e causal link they highlight may prove useful in understanding 
the mechanisms driving norm acceptance, but other causal factors 
require further theorizing. As mentioned earlier, Garrett’s func-
tional theory of cooperation provides many of the missing pieces. 
In studying member states’ motivations for signing the SEA, Gar-
rett argues that the “ever-growing trade dependence of the Euro-
pean economies, combined with more than a decade of poor and 
declining performance (Eurosclerosis), greatly increased the ben-
efits of completing the common market relative to the costs of co-
operation.”44 !e data illustrate that this is what happened in Italy. 
Poor economic performance, coupled with an integration agenda 
that enlarged at an increasing pace throughout the 1980s, were two 
of the major factors that led to the internalization of the norm. In 
addition, Garrett notes that, “government instability increased dra-
matically in Europe during the late 1970s and early 1980s as voters 
punished their leaders for not arresting economic decline.”45 It is 
plausible to suggest, then, that political considerations were also 
an important part of the Italian government’s decision to play an 
active role in the integration process.
Although the argument advanced in this paper borrows 
many of its insights from Garrett’s conceptualization of European 
integration, there are a few shortcomings that it also seeks to rem-
edy. First, Garrett’s argument does not adequately operationalize 
the factor of economic decline. Second, Garrett suggests that the 
electorate’s dissatisfaction with the economy is an important fac-
tor driving a government’s policy choices. However, it is possible 
that other issues may be deemed salient by the population—issues 
which the government may seek to accommodate. Finally, Garrett’s 
explanation is not particularly clear with regard to the role that 
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economic issues actually played; were they an end in themselves, 
or were they means to other objectives? In the following section, I 
illustrate how these shortcomings can be remedied by developing a 
testable argument as to why Italy decided to accept the supremacy 
of European law. 
Italy Accepts the Supremacy of EC Law
As the previous section illustrates, the existing literature on 
cooperation and socialization provides some of the answers needed 
in order to craft an argument about Italy’s acceptance of supremacy, 
but none of the approaches are exhaustive. By adopting some of 
the insights offered by both the neofunctionalist and institution-
al choice frameworks, I develop a three-part explanation. I argue 
that the economic downturns produced by the oil crisis of 1979, 
an overwhelming public support for European integration, and the 
ongoing integration process, converged in leading the Italian gov-
ernment to accept the supremacy of European law. 
"e economic turmoil of the 1970s, in particular the 1979 
oil crisis, raised Italian inflation rates to above 20 percent within 
two years (see Appendix A). At the same time, unemployment lev-
els remained high, continuing to increase throughout the 1980s. 
"ese economic issues were two of the Italian population’s major 
concerns during this decade. In addition, the vast majority of Ital-
ians looked to Europe as the most viable solution to their financial 
problems, so their support for further integration was particularly 
high, especially when compared with that of other EC states. At the 
European level, integration was witnessing one of its most active 
moments. After the slumber of the 1970s, the European agenda 
suddenly enlarged; beginning with the 1979 European Monetary 
System, the process saw a steady rise with the signing of the SEA in 
1986, and the approach of the 1992 deadline for the creation of the 
Single Market. "e Italian government was thus confronted with 
three factors: economic downturns, public discontent and support 
for Europe, and a revived European agenda. It consequently un-
derstood that the best way to bolster the national economy, and 
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thus appease its electorate was to eliminate the most cumbersome 
barrier to the economic benefits integration would bring. It is for 
this reason that in 1984 the government sought to have supremacy 
recognized by filing the suit that led to the Granital case. However, 
because the resulting opinion did not perfectly align with the stan-
dards mandated by the ECJ, the government finally enacted the La 
Pergola law in 1989, which officially put an end to Italy’s rejection 
of the norm.
I offer two indicators for the measurement of economic down-
turns: rising unemployment and high inflation. In addition to be-
ing the two most salient economic issues in the time period under 
consideration, they also capture the demand side of the equation: 
the population. Indeed, in order for this variable to have an effect 
on the decision calculations of the government, it must be one that 
directly relates to the economic perceptions of the public. Lack of 
employment can be considered as constituting a direct impact, and 
the price level of commodities will impact an individual’s percep-
tion of her economic welfare. Unemployment rates are measured 
yearly, and an increase is detected when the rate in year X is greater 
than the rate in year X-1, or: U(x) > U(x-1). 
Inflation is measured both in absolute terms and in relation 
to other EC member states. #e key aspect of these indicators is 
that they matter insofar as they are perceived to matter. #us, while 
I offer objective measures of their actual levels, it is important to 
understand how serious the Italian public and the Italian govern-
ment perceived them to be. Indeed, it is possible that even a mini-
mum level of dissatisfaction may be the reflection of some level of 
real decline.
Public opinion captures the population’s perceptions of the 
national economy and of the progress of European integration. It 
is characterized as either high or low. #is is determined by show-
ing that the support percentages are high both in absolute terms 
and in relation to other EC members. #e questions examined are 
specific in that they explicitly refer to an individual’s feelings about 
the economy, the problem of unemployment, and the process of 
European unification. #is dramatically decreases the amount of 
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bias the analyst may encounter when interpreting levels of public 
opinion. 
!e European agenda with regard to integration is a relatively 
larger concept to be captured. It is not possible to include all the 
steps that contributed to integration in the 1980s. For instance, 
issues regarding political, security, and foreign policy integration, 
although important, are not the focus of this analysis. Rather, the 
focus is centered on the major turning points: the EMS, the SEA, 
and the EMU. Indicators of an ongoing integration process aimed 
at further cohesion are: whether the rhetoric employed refers to 
the economic gains to be obtained from integration, whether im-
provement in unemployment and inflation levels are mentioned as 
important goals, and whether the acceptance of a European body 
of law is mentioned as necessary for the attainment of the Single 
Market. 
It is clear that the three causal factors illustrated above are 
cast at both the domestic and systemic levels of analysis. Public 
opinion is a dynamic that develops internally, and thus captures the 
domestic level. Conversely, the European agenda’s evolution takes 
place outside of Italy, and although the individuals affecting it are 
to some extent acting as representatives of their countries of origin, 
the process itself is regional, both in its nature and in its objective. 
Finally, economic downturns are a variable that captures both levels 
of analysis, for no economic dynamic is solely the product of a given 
state’s internal policies. !us, while the problems were particularly 
severe in the Italian case—probably because of the profligacy of 
its economic actors—some weight must also be attributed to the 
external factors affecting its economy. 
!e unit of analysis driving this argument is cast at the group 
level. !e preferences of the Italian public are examined on an ag-
gregate level, because of the nature of the empirical data. !is de-
termination also suggests that the economic factors ought to be 
viewed in light of their aggregate impact on the Italian population 
as a whole. Lastly, the European agenda is not analyzed as the prod-
uct of any particular European actor’s endeavors. Rather, these ac-
tors at the European level will be viewed as the representation of a 
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group of Europeans who, because of their beliefs and in light of cer-
tain goals, drafted an agenda with a specific structure and content. 
In order to understand how these factors impacted the out-
come in question, an illustration of the causal mechanism is im-
perative. !e casual link in the argument is represented by the Ital-
ian government. !e main contention is that the Italian executive 
was particularly receptive to these internal and external dynamics, 
and that the government’s decisions to initiate the 1984 case and 
the 1989 enactment were a conscious effort to account for all three 
factors. 
!us, in light of the preceding discussion, it is possible to hy-
pothesize that:
Economic downturns, overwhelming public support for Europe 
and dissatisfaction with the economy, and an ongoing integra-
tion process, converged in leading the Italian government to ac-
cept the supremacy of EC law. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
!e data presented in this section cover the decade beginning 
in 1979 and ending in 1989 with the enactment of the La Pergola 
law. !e main objective is to establish the causal link between the 
three factors identified and the outcome under consideration. !e 
approach is qualitative in nature, although some quantitative details 
are provided. !e case material is organized in three main sections, 
each section showing the independent impact of each causal factor 
over time. !e aim is to single out each variable so that implications 
may be drawn about its specific role in effecting the outcome. !is 
is particularly useful given that different combinations of these fac-
tors may apply to other cases outside this one. 
With regard to the European agenda, the vast majority of the 
evidence derives from official EC reports and authoritative second-
ary sources on the subject. !is provides exposure to the official 
aspect of the agenda, while simultaneously assessing different in-
terpretations of the various steps of integration. !e data about 
Italy’s economy were obtained from the databases of the Interna-
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tional Monetary Fund and the Organization for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development. Data concerning Italian public opinion 
were obtained from the yearly polls of the Eurobarometer, a series 
of surveys distributed to the public by the European Commission, 
well known for detailed questions focused on national and Euro-
pean matters, with an emphasis on the latter.
Obviously, the methodology suffers from some limitations. 
"e Eurobarometer, although a sophisticated device, is a polling 
system and thus presents some bias in the way its questions are 
phrased. Second, like any type of survey, the Eurobarometer is also 
limited in the kind and size of sample it represents. However, here 
it is assumed that the information obtained from the Eurobarom-
eter is reflective of the Italian population as a whole.
"ird, due to technical difficulties, Eurobarometer data were 
not available for all years between 1979 and 1989, because some 
editions lost some of their pages in the scanning process. Years with 
no data are marked as N/A. 
Fourth, the term "supremacy," and the idea behind it, are judi-
cial concepts, and therefore it did not appear with much frequency 
in the official documents of either the EC or the Italian govern-
ment. However, supremacy captures much of the legal underpin-
nings of the move toward integration; for instance, terms such as 
‘approximation of laws,’ ‘harmonization of regulations,’ ‘legal cohe-
sion,’ all imply, in one way or the other, that EC law is to be set on a 
higher level than its conflicting national counterpart.  
Analysis of the Granital case introduces an additional meth-
odological limitation. "is limitation revolves around the govern-
ment’s motivation for filing the suit, and the actual reasons that led 
the fifteen judges to issue their opinion. Admittedly, there may have 
been other factors that pushed the government to bring the case, 
but the argument here assumes that if the desire to account for 
the three causal factors was not the leading cause, it surely was one 
among them. "is is even more likely given the role the causal fac-
tors generally played in the process. With regard to the court’s deci-
sion, the only available source is the text of the case itself, due to the 
unanimity of all of the court’s decisions. "us, within the confines 
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of this study, there is no method by which to ascertain the actual 
motivations of the fifteen judges.  !erefore, it is assumed that the 
court took an affirmative step toward Europe, perhaps pushed by 
the fact that the complaining party in the case was the executive.
1SRIXEV]7XVYKKPI-R¾EXMSR
!e 1979 Iranian revolution produced effects that were felt 
throughout the entire Western world, including Italy.46 !ere were 
no doubts about how the crisis would impact the country; it was 
clear from the outset that the Italian economy would be “suddenly 
and radically” changed.47 !e most immediate effect was the im-
pact on the price level of gasoline, but this soon impacted all goods. 
A sudden rise in inflation was inevitable.48
!e government saw a very busy year, trying to find the best 
possible means to mitigate the inflationary impact on the Italian 
economy. At the close of the year, the Minister for the Economy 
Antonio Bisaglia assured his interviewers that, “in light of the data 
we are receiving, we are evaluating the oil situation . . . .However, 
we are moving along a path that will on the one hand provide us 
with the most petroleum, and on the other will produce the small-
est possible impact on inflation.”49 Unfortunately, the hoped-for 
results did not come about immediately. As Appendix A shows, 
the already high inflation rate of 14 percent increased the following 
year, reaching a historic maximum of almost 22 percent.50 How-
ever, in 1981, the rate began a steady decline that would bring it to 
4.75 percent in 1987, the lowest value Italy saw in the 1980s. 
Italy was not the only Western state to be impacted by the 
Iranian crisis; in some fashion, all EC members had to deal with 
higher petroleum prices and rising inflation rates. However, Italy 
was the most heavily impacted among the ten. Germany and France 
also faced their highest rates in 1981, but the latter’s reached 13.33 
percent, while the former’s a ‘mere’ 6.32 percent.51 !ese relative 
differences are important because they highlight the particularly 
difficult situation Italians faced. !is helps to explain their low 
confidence in the government’s ability to solve their problems, and 
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therefore their high support for the European Community. More-
over, as Italy was one of the largest exporters in the EC, its manu-
facturers saw the increase in prices as a direct threat to their eco-
nomic transactions. As the Minister for the Economy noted, the 
high inflation rate “would soon erase the competitiveness of our 
goods, which is already in decline.”52
Although entry into the EMS had been “considered a useful 
tool to impose deflationary policies on the domestic social and po-
litical actors,”53 by 1985 the inflationary situation was still a se-
rious concern.54 Indeed, although the inflation rate in 1985 had 
decreased by eleven percentage points from its peak in 1980, it was 
still one of the highest in Europe.55 Italy’s lack of success in adapt-
ing to the standards of the EMS is further evidenced by the fact 
that in 1988 the rate began its second steady increase of the decade. 
!e reasons behind Italy’s inability to bring its inflation levels 
closer to those of its European counterparts are not immediately 
clear. Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone suggest that, from 
its inception, the EMS “came as something as a shock for the Ital-
ian monetary authorities.”56 In fact, Italian acceptance of the EMS 
was not without internal opposition. !e skeptics were numerous; 
they all feared the costs that entrance into the system would en-
tail. !e head of Confindustria, the national employers’ organiza-
tion, “saw the design as faulty.”57 !e Minister for External Trade 
thought the EMS “would be less cohesive [than the ‘Snake’] and 
was thus doomed from the start.”58 !e Minister for Agriculture 
“foresaw an intolerable burden on Italian agriculture.”59 Even the 
Banca d’Italia, the Central Bank, “feared that the new EMS would 
be unworkable, or at least that the Italians would not be able to live 
with it.”60 
!e government understood that these fears were perhaps 
the reflection of internal systemic weaknesses. Given the country’s 
inability to bring down its inflation rate to the level of its Euro-
pean counterparts, the government sought action at the continental 
level, even after entry into the EMS. In his 1985 address to the Eu-
ropean Parliament, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi recognized that 
Italy was among those countries that, “still [had] to follow a more 
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prudent course to preclude a recurrence of the phenomenon of in-
flation.”61 He emphasized that it was for this precise reason that 
the Italian government would be, “among those who favour a com-
prehensive recovery programme based on differentiated policies: 
more expansive policies for countries with a high level of stability, 
and more prudent ones for countries where . . . levels of inflation are 
somewhat higher.”62 
"us, the inflation problem remained a constant concern 
throughout the decade, probably due to Italy’s inability to adapt 
to EC standards. "e government’s pressure for solutions at the 
European level further illustrates its belief that Europe would be 
the only source of real solutions. It is not excessive to suggest, then, 
that if the solutions would derive from Europe, anything acting as 
an obstacle to their receipt would need to be displaced. Ensuring 
that European rules regulating economic and monetary solutions 
would be supreme over national laws was imperative. 
Unemployment: The Constant Fight
During the few months preceding the Iranian crisis, Italy had 
seen a modest improvement in its overall economic situation.63 
"is had partially been the result of the Pandolfi Plan, a three-year 
economic plan named after Treasury Minister Filippo Pandolfi, 
which aimed at lowering labor costs.64 "is improvement ended 
with the advent of the crisis and inflation. As Appendix B shows, 
Italy’s unemployment rate began its rise in 1980 and continued this 
trend throughout the decade. "ere is little doubt that unemploy-
ment levels were very closely connected to the problem of inflation; 
if the competitiveness of national goods was damaged, their pro-
duction, and thus the manpower behind it, would also be affected. 
As the general attitude indicated, unemployment was the 
main concern of the Italian public. At the end of every year, on the 
evening of December 31, the president of the republic addresses 
the Italian population, laying out the main themes of the ending 
year. "e president then addresses the people with exhortations as 
to how to better face these challenges. "e president of the repub-
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lic retains very little political power in Italy; however, his symbolic 
importance is notable. President Sandro Pertini (1978–1984) ad-
dressed the issue of unemployment in all seven of his end-of-year 
speeches. His appeals to the public and to the government are best 
captured in his last address, delivered on December 31, 1984, in 
which he emphasized:
Unemployment is an awful evil. Numerous Italian families, who 
are listening at this moment, will spend a very sad beginning of 
the year because unemployment has invaded their homes. !us, 
they will not be able to greet the new year with joy; there will be 
misery in their homes. Let us fight unemployment.65 
!e president’s direct appeal to the public on this yearly cer-
emony indicates the impact unemployment had on the country as 
a whole. 
More importantly, by the mid-1980s unemployment was the 
most salient issue at the center of the political debate, as evidenced 
by the rhetoric used in the context of national and European elec-
tions. In a 1983 La Stampa article, Carlo Donat-Cattin, a Chris-
tian-Democratic candidate for that year’s parliamentary elections, 
was reported to have stated: “We need a government that will fight 
unemployment and inflation.”66 !e issue was also contentious at 
the level of European elections. Claudio Martelli, the vice-secretary 
of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) noted that, “the socialist parties 
[of Europe] are concentrating their efforts on the fight against un-
employment, which is our primary objective.”67 !e editors of La 
Stampa were clear: 
We cannot say with determination that the ending legislature, 
born in 1979, has been responsible for the most serious reces-
sion Italy has seen since the end of the Second World War . . .  
We can say, however, that it has cradled it . . . because it leaves 
us with an unemployment rate [above 10%], from little more 
than 2 million to well above 2 million and 750 thousand unem-
ployed.68
!ese statements point to the high salience of unemployment 
as a social and political issue. !e government of the mid-1980s 
was well aware of this, and sought to find a solution employing all 
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means available. However, an increase in growth and production 
at the national level would not suffice; joint action with the other 
members of the EC was required. An important opportunity pre-
sented itself when it became Italy’s turn to hold the presidency of 
the Council of Ministers in the first half of 1985. Prime Minister 
Craxi was clear in his emphasis on unemployment as the major 
concern, and on joint European action as the best solution:
[W]e discussed at length the economic and social situation in 
the Community, a feature of which is still the unacceptably high 
level of unemployment at over 10% which is in sharp contrast 
with the prosperity of our nations and undermines the credibil-
ity of our system . . . . We have defined guidelines with a view to 
economic growth such as may create new jobs. [One of the main 
challenges, then, is] how to reconcile industrial innovation with 
the protection of employment. It is something we must tackle as 
a matter of urgency.69  
"e issue remained the center of national attention until the 
end of the decade. In 1988, unemployment touched almost three 
million people, and the ex-Minister of Labor Gianni de Michelis 
(1983–1987) was reported to have referred to the situation as “ad-
ditionally dramatic,” especially in light of the reported growth in 
GDP at the end of 1987.70 Besides being real, then, the problem of 
unemployment persisted until the late 1980s, and persisted in the 
rhetoric of Italian government officials.  Concerns over unemploy-
ment would prove to be crucial in the government’s identification 
of the measures to take in order to respect the 1992 deadline. 
Public Opinion: The Attitude of Italians Toward Integration and 
the Economy
"e bulk of these data derives from two types of Eurobarom-
eter questions. "e first regard the public’s overall satisfaction with 
the economy, and its thoughts about unemployment; the second 
reflect the population’s attitude toward Europe, the impact of EC 
membership, and the support for further and more cohesive co-
operation between EC member states. "e charts illustrating the 
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questions and their answers in appropriate context are provided in 
Appendix C. 
!e two questions Italians most often heard when con-
fronted with Eurobarometer pollsters were: “In general, are you 
for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?”; and 
“Generally speaking, do you think your country’s membership of 
the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good 
nor bad?” As can be seen with regard to the first question, Italians 
consistently supported efforts toward further integration. In 1979, 
86 percent of the population said they were for further unifica-
tion. !is number did not decrease much throughout the decade, 
reaching its lowest in 1982, when more than three-fourths of the 
population still thought unification was an appealing outcome (See 
Appendix C, Table 1).  
With regard to the feelings toward benefits derived from 
membership in the EC, the percentage of Italians who saw mem-
bership as a good thing never went below 66 percent of the popula-
tion. By 1988, over 80 percent of the population thought that Italy 
had benefited from its membership in the EC. Italy consistently 
ranked among the countries with the highest support for closer 
European integration. !e contrast is even more striking when 
compared with some other member states, such as Denmark or the 
United Kingdom, where support for the EC was never particularly 
high.71 !is incongruence between member states is important be-
cause it suggests that Italian public support was not just part of a 
larger European trend. Indeed, it was peculiar to Italy. 
In 1979, Italians were asked an additional question that did 
not appear in following years.  !e question read: “Do you think 
the movement toward unification of Europe should be speeded up, 
slow down, or continue as present?” A clear majority of Italians, 
55 percent in the spring and 66 percent in the autumn (averaging 
60.5) thought the process should speed up. While support for the 
pro-European option was not as high as in the previous questions, 
the Appendices show that Italy was the only country among the 
nine where the majority opted for a quicker process; most other 
Europeans thought the process should continue unaltered.72  
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!e polls also included several queries about the public’s at-
titude toward the economy, and unemployment in particular. In 
1979, in light of the first direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment, Italians were asked: “Among the three following things, 
which represents your strongest hope from the work of the new 
European Parliament? Should it control administrators and offi-
cials; speed up the process of unification; or take the initiative to 
make the Member States work together to face the economic cri-
sis in Europe?” 68 percent of Italian respondents thought that the 
new Parliament should work to encourage members to act jointly 
to solve the economic crisis (Appendix C).73 
A recurrent question was: “How do you think the general sit-
uation in your country has changed in the past twelve months?” Re-
sponses were available only for the years between 1982 and 1985. It 
is striking that over three-fourths of the Italian population thought 
that the economic situation throughout 1981 had gotten worse, 
and only 11 percent of respondents thought it had improved. !is 
trend decreased over the four following years; but, by 1985, almost 
half of the population still thought the economy had not seen any 
improvement. 
Finally, when in 1982 they were asked whether they thought 
unemployment would be better fought if Italy acted alone or jointly 
through the EC, 65 percent of Italians believed that joint European 
action would produce the best outcome.74 Concern about unem-
ployment was also apparent when Italians were asked: “What do 
you think is the biggest problem that will change life in the next 
ten or fifteen years?” 60 percent of respondents thought that unem-
ployment would be the second most life-changing factor, preceded 
only by fear of crime and terrorism.75 
Some commentators have suggested that in Italy, the “popular 
association of Europe with wealth strengthened” over time.76  It 
is, then, plausible to suggest that “the political elites . . . would lose 
prestige if Italy could not remain abreast of EC developments.”77 
Public consciousness of the country’s financial problems thus urged 
the government to adopt affirmative measures aimed at ensuring 
a smoother integration process. !e government’s activism is at-
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tested by the 1985 Milan summit predating the SEA, 78 and by the 
multiple speeches delivered to the European Parliament during the 
Italian presidency, as noted above.  But it was most apparent in its 
decision to officially decree that European law would be supreme 
over national law. In order to fully understand the government’s 
move toward internalization, the larger context in which it oper-
ated must also be taken into consideration. "e third causal factor, 
the integration process itself, will be illustrated in the next section.
European Integration: The Process 
By the end of the 1970s, “increasing economic divergence and 
dwindling political enthusiasm for the European ideal had created 
a situation in which the prospects for further advances toward Eu-
ropean unity seemed extremely gloomy.”79 "e EMS was, in the 
eyes of then-President of the Commission Roy Jenkins, the means 
through which both political and economic problems would be 
solved.80 In a speech delivered in Florence, shortly before the sign-
ing of the agreement, Jenkins emphasized the economic advantages 
the EMS would bring. "e gains included a stronger and more de-
veloped industry and a credible alternative to the U.S. dollar but, 
more importantly, it would “contribute to the battle against infla-
tion [and] it would help reduce unemployment.”81 "e Italian gov-
ernment could not ignore these prospects. As president of Confin-
dustria Guido Carli aptly noted, “[i]f Italy is too weak to participate 
in the EMS, it is also true that she is too weak not to participate.”82 
But improvements did not come about as rapidly as the govern-
ment would have wished. Italian monetary policy had difficulties 
adapting to the new “external constraint,” and the fiscal problems 
persisted.83
However, Europe had gained momentum. On June 19, 1983, 
the heads of the Ten convened in Stuttgart, Germany and signed 
the Solemn Declaration on European Union. "e Declaration con-
stituted an intermediate step toward the SEA , and was the prod-
uct of the so-called German-Italian initiative, a proposal submitted 
by the foreign ministers of the two countries in 1981.84 "e most 
204 7VSYV-XEP]%GGITXWXLI7YTVIQEG]SJ)'0E[
important aspect of the Stuttgart Declaration was its scope. Article 
3.1.1 called for:
An overall economic strategy in the Community to combat un-
employment and inflation and to promote convergence of the 
state of economic development of the Member States. Priority 
should be given to encouraging productive investment and rais-
ing competitiveness as a basis for creating durable jobs, bringing 
about sustained economic growth and reducing unemployment. 
In this context, effective action . . . should be taken . . . by means 
of . . . harmonization of social security systems.85 
"e emphases on unemployment and inflation are key ele-
ments of this provision. 
Article 3.4 is also particularly relevant. Entitled “Approxima-
tion of Laws,” it provided: 
Approximation of laws in areas within the competence of the 
European Communities will be pursued and intensified through 
effective use of the measures provided for in the Treaties. . . . 
Among new activities which can be conductive to the attainment 
of European Union, the following deserve special attention: the 
introduction of legal instruments which can strengthen coop-
eration among the judicial authorities of the Member States . 
. . which can thereby make the administration of justice more 
efficient and less cumbersome; cooperation in the area of sup-
pression of infringements of Community law.86
"e article’s mention of legal approximation and the problem 
of community law infringements were obviously an invitation to 
heed the dictates of European law supremacy. Given the integra-
tion process’ particular emphasis on unemployment and inflation, 
if the socioeconomic benefits were to be obtained, affirmative inter-
nal steps had to be taken in order to ensure that this would be the 
case.
"e path toward the SEA had been officially opened. "e 
German-Italian initiative was soon emulated by other committees 
at the European level. "e Dooge Committee, chaired by former 
Irish foreign affairs minister James Dooge, included one represen-
tative for each member state and one member from the European 
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Commission.87 !e final report proposed, among other things, 
“the creation of . . . a European legal area, the strengthening of the 
European Monetary System, and the development of common pol-
icies on the environment, culture, and social affairs.”88
!e appeal these new steps held for the Italian government 
became most apparent when the EC members reviewed the Dooge 
report at the Milan European Council held on June 28–29, 1985 
and chaired by Prime Minister Craxi. !e Italian presidency was 
adamant in its efforts to overcome any political deadlock and con-
clude the conference with substantial results that would lead to 
tangible solutions. When the situation seemed to be stalling, Prime 
Minister Craxi, “for the first time in the history of the Community, 
plumped for a new interpretation of Article 236 of the Treaty of 
Rome . . . by putting the issue to a vote.”89 Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands voted in 
favor of the motion, and the mandate for the creation of a Euro-
pean Union was issued.90 Given that these types of decisions had 
always been achieved through consensus, the Italian suggestion was 
groundbreaking.91 
However, despite the energetic effort and the prolonged ne-
gotiations, the final draft of the SEA deeply disappointed the Ital-
ian government. Foreign Affairs Minister Giulio Andreotti noted, 
with much regret:
An objective examination of the results of the Intergovernmen-
tal Conference shows that the Single European Act is merely a 
partial and unsatisfactory response to the need for substantial 
progress in the direction indicated by the European Parliament 
and by the reports of the Dooge and Adonnino Committees . 
. . .!e Single European Act does not therefore represent the 
realization of that fundamental reform of the European Com-
munity for which the Italian Government has been striving and 
which was desired by the national parliament.92
Despite the disappointment, Andreotti’s stance toward the 
future of integration and national implementation was clear: “Italy 
intends to use the opportunity afforded by the signing of the Single 
European Act to reaffirm its determination to work to ensure that 
206 7VSYV-XEP]%GGITXWXLI7YTVIQEG]SJ)'0E[
the limited reforms agreed upon are not only applied in full but in 
addition, and above all, that they are carried out in a progressive 
manner.”93 !e process was not over. 
Indeed, Europe now embarked on its path toward the “1992 
deadline.” By 1988, the process toward the EMU had gained full 
speed. !at year, the European Commission published the Cec-
chini Report, named after Paolo Cecchini, the commissioner who 
had coordinated the study. !e aim of the report was to, “evaluate 
scientifically the benefits of the single market.”94 !e primary re-
sults showed that, “the first and immediate effects will be in terms 
of downward pressure on prices and costs . . . .[In addition, t]he 
positive impact on employment could in the medium-term amount 
to about 2 millions jobs.”95 !e report warned, however, that, “if 
Europe is to get the most out of its large home market, the internal 
frontiers must truly disappear and be free of administrative compli-
cations between Member States. All barriers have to be removed, 
otherwise the last remaining barriers may on their own be sufficient 
to keep the markets segmented.”96 Conflicting national regulations 
thus had to be invalidated if these barriers were to truly disappear. 
!e Cecchini Report was not the only document illustrat-
ing the momentum that integration had gathered by the end of 
the 1980s. !e same year the report was issued, the Commission 
released a document authored by Dominique Servais. !is was a 
comprehensive account of where the path toward the 1992 dead-
line was heading, what it required, and what its implications would 
be.97 !e document sought to clarify the concept of “internal mar-
ket” by noting that it, “goes deeper, since it not only assumes the 
elimination of obstacles which are currently considered lawful in 
Community law, but aims at positive integration, implying that ac-
count must be taken of objectives of economic, social and legisla-
tive cohesion.”98 !is was no small step, and it required substantial 
institutional change on the part of each of the member states. How 
would this ambitious goal be achieved? !e document stated that 
the solution would be found in the “harmonization of national reg-
ulation [,] mutual recognition of national regulations, and the at-
tribution of a ‘Community effect’ to national protection systems.”99 
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!e document thus called on all member states to fully accept the 
supremacy of European law, especially in light of the fact that the 
mutual recognition principle was absent in national legal systems. 
!e principle had been introduced in 1979, when the European 
Court of Justice had held that goods produced in one state could be 
sold in another.100  !e principle had now become one of the main 
goals of the 1992 deadline, and it required the supremacy norm to 
be present.
In sum, the drive toward integration had been gaining strength 
throughout the decade. !e SEA marked the peak of European 
ambitions, in both economic and legal terms. !e 1992 deadline 
constituted a meaningful incentive for member states, Italy among 
them, to eliminate all obstacles that divided them from the gains to 
be obtained. 
Supremacy is Internalized
!e Italian government acted in light of the existence, and 
persistence, of the three causal factors illustrated in the previous 
sections. Minister Andreotti’s statement to the European Parlia-
ment in 1985 illustrates the government’s recognition of the deep 
economic problems affecting the country: 
In our view, unemployment is the central problem to be resolved, 
and it is at this problem that we believe specific analyses and 
action should be directed on a concerted basis by the Member 
States of the Community . . . .!e Italian Presidency therefore 
intends to ensure that the central importance of the issue of em-
ployment is the main criterion guiding the determination and 
development of Community instruments and . . . initiatives.101
!e government also recognized what the requirements for 
fighting unemployment were, as the German-Italian initiative, the 
Milan Council, and the dissatisfaction with the SEA all showed. 
!e central contention of this study is that the government’s deci-
sion to bring the Granital case to court in 1984 reflected its con-
comitant desire to act internally. !e case had risen when the gov-
ernment imposed an import levy on the Italian company Granital 
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S.p.A.102 !e levy followed the standards that had been decreed 
by the European Court of Justice in one of its recent cases.103 !e 
company refused to pay by invoking a national legislation that con-
tradicted the ruling of the ECJ. A suit was filed and it reached the 
Constitutional Court. !ere, the parties sought a judgment on the 
issue of the relationship between the community regulation and the 
national legislation conflicting with it. !e court’s opinion finally 
established that community law would be supreme over national 
law. However, because “each is regarded as an independent and sep-
arate legal system . . . a Community regulation, when in force, does 
not abrogate, in the proper meaning of the word, a provision of 
municipal law which is inconsistent with it, but prevents this provi-
sion from becoming relevant in the settlement of a dispute before a 
national court.”104 !e timing of the court’s decision is crucial; the 
opinion was issued during the peak negotiation period, between 
the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration, and the SEA. However, the legal 
distinction it drew, between “abrogation” and “irrelevance”, was sub-
stantial. Simply classifying the national regulation as “irrelevant” 
meant that it could still be applied in other similar, though not 
identical, circumstances. More importantly, it meant that it could 
still be invoked in future suits, thus creating additional hurdles in 
the transposition and implementation of EU law.  
It was because of this peculiar reservation that the La Per-
gola law was enacted. Article 3, section 1, sub-section (a) of the 
act, which included the substance of the new legislation, provided 
that the “periodic adjustment of the national legal system to the 
communitarian system, is ensured through the amendment or in-
validation of national regulations in contrast with the obligations 
established in article 1, section 1.”105 !e internalization process 
was thus completed. Italy could now fully enjoy the benefits of the 
Single Market. !is would enable its government to solve its eco-
nomic problems and thus placate its deeply dissatisfied public. 
CONCLUSIONS 
!e main contention of this paper has been that Italy’s deci-
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sion to accept the supremacy of European law was the product of 
three causal factors. !e economic downturns that began in the late 
1970s and stretched throughout the 1980s constituted the major 
concern of the Italian population. !e dissatisfaction of the public 
was coupled with its overwhelming support for a united Europe 
and a continuing integration process. !ese two internal factors, 
together with the revived integration agenda at the European level, 
induced the government to take affirmative steps toward the accep-
tance of European law supremacy. !is was primarily an effort by 
the government to solve the economic difficulties of the population 
by removing the major legal obstacle to the receipt of the benefits 
of integration. 
!e evidence suggests that the 1980s were characterized by 
a tumultuous economy, here operationalized as the levels of infla-
tion and unemployment. While inflation decreased substantial-
ly—albeit without ever descending below 4 percent—unemploy-
ment remained the one major problem in light of its persistent 
rise throughout the decade. !is explains the population’s overall 
concern regarding unemployment and the economy more gener-
ally. In addition, as the Eurobarometer polls suggest, Italians had 
a particularly positive and supportive attitude toward Europe and 
further integration. As demonstrated by the steps taken toward 
the SEA and EMU, the integration process saw a revived inten-
sity during these years. !e data also suggest that the government 
was responsive to the internal economic dissatisfaction, and to the 
external integration process. !is was evidenced by the particular 
role unemployment and inflation played in the political discourse 
and by the markedly "maximalist" role Italy played at the European 
level.106 Finally, the government’s role in the process is illustrated 
by its efforts to bring the supremacy norm into the domestic realm 
in the Granital case and by its enactment of the communitarian law 
in 1989. 
Interestingly, the evidence also suggests that the Italian gov-
ernment opted for Europe in spite of the preferences of its elites. 
An example is provided by the accession of EMS, fervently opposed 
by the economic technocrats of the time. But it was also apparent 
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in the SEA itself. Italy decided to sign the treaty, despite the fact 
that it was an “unsatisfactory response to the need for substantial 
progress.”107 !is provides insight into the way the Italian poli-
cymaking process may function in certain delicate circumstances; 
faced with two options, either an unsatisfactory deal or no deal at 
all, Italian elites opted for the former option. !is was true despite 
the fact that this was not what Italy as a country sought. Never-
theless, Giulio Andreotti’s statement evaluating the outcome of the 
Intergovernmental Conference (see page 29) suggests that the Ital-
ian administration saw the SEA as a small, perhaps necessary, step 
toward the loftier goals Italy had set for itself. Further research may 
be useful in better understanding whether, as the data in this proj-
ect seem to suggest, the pressure of public opinion was so strong as 
to almost "coerce" the government into pursuing policies that are 
not immediately and clearly beneficial. In particular, it is important 
to understand whether the goal of reelection supersedes most other 
considerations.  
!ere was never any doubt that Italy would eventually accept 
the supremacy of European law. !e question then becomes one 
of why it happened in 1989, and not earlier or later. !e argument 
has been that the convergence of the three dynamics paved the path 
for acceptance. However, did they all matter equally? !is question 
can be answered with a fair degree of confidence, only if we were to 
isolate each factor and assess its independent impact by controlling 
for the other two. Some counterfactual speculation is thus in order.
Italy’s initial refusal to sign the SEA, and its later acceptance, 
provide a useful example. !e refusal was evidence of the fact that 
the treaty did not fully satisfy the Italians, because it did not per-
fectly align with their preferences. Of course, the problem was not 
that it was too costly; it simply was not enough. However, we may 
wonder what would have been the outcome if the treaty had not 
aligned with their preferences, in that it had been too costly, or too 
restrictive. Would it have been signed? !e EMS example suggests 
that the answer would be yes. Entrance into the system showed 
that the internal institutional costs could be withstood and that 
there was a strong likelihood that the government would lose its 
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prestige if it did not “remain abreast of EC developments.” 108 !is 
may in fact be the case with regard to the SEA, EMU, and with the 
necessary adoption of the supremacy norm. 
!is concern about prestige may have been even more rel-
evant for a government that between 1981 and 1992 was based 
on a coalition of five different parties, the so-called pentapartito. 
Although the five parties, the Christian-Democrats, the Socialists, 
the Social-Democrats, the Republicans, and the Liberals all had a 
positive and supportive stance toward Europe, each worried about 
their own constituencies, on whose support they depended for 
their permanence in the coalition. A look at previous support for 
European integration also suggests that Italians were not as ada-
mant as they were during the 1980s. In the 1950s, only 57 percent 
of the population supported further unification, and a number that 
climbed only to 60 percent during the 1960s.109 Indeed, before 
1970, Italian support for unification was among the lowest in Eu-
rope, compared to Germany’s 70 and 81 percent in 1952 and 1962 
respectively, or the Netherlands’ 87 percent in 1962.110 
Changes in Italian attitudes toward Europe seem to coincide 
with the changes in the overall national economy, and in particu-
lar with unemployment and inflation. !roughout the 1950s and 
1960s, Italy had seen times of prosperity thanks to the “near-re-
ligious adheren[ce] to classical liberalism” that had characterized 
the Luigi Einaudi reforms.111 !ose policies had brought inflation 
down, and the rising unemployment had been stopped thanks to 
the increase in exports that soon ensued.112 According to Dyson 
and Featherstone, this was immediately reflected in the “Christian 
Democrats collect[ing] the votes.”113 !e likelihood of econom-
ic downturns being a precondition for substantial institutional 
change is high. !is explains norm acceptance as a change designed 
to account for the economy and its impact on the population. 
However, the question still remains whether this institutional 
shift would have taken place with the same determination had the 
integration process not been as momentous as in the late 1980s. But 
this still begs the question of whether integration itself would have 
been so active had the economy of Europe been in good condition. 
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!e counterfactual nature of this inquiry, added to the uniqueness 
of the process, precludes any accurate answer. However, further re-
search may assess with more precision whether other instances of 
revived European integration—for instance, the run to the euro, or 
the adoption of the constitutional treaty—did or did not coincide 
with periods of economic crises and recessions.
In sum, economic considerations may play a very important 
role in driving states toward the pursuit of institutional changes 
that tend to alter their sovereign control over their policies. But 
such considerations do not explain the precise mechanisms leading 
to these alterations. Evaluating how the problems are manipulated 
domestically is key to capturing the entire picture. !is has been 
the main objective of the argument advanced in this study. Admit-
tedly, the evident reach of this argument is within the sphere of 
European integration, and in particular Italy’s relationship with 
this process. However, the argument’s external validity may be em-
phasized in two ways. 
First, the causal mechanism underpinning the argument, and 
the causal factors driving the norm internalization process may 
prove useful in assessing other instances of integration within the 
current Union. Integration is an ongoing process, and the constant-
ly growing body of law that regulates the interaction between mem-
ber states attests to this fact. !e relatively recent debate over the 
Constitutional Treaty, its rejection by the Dutch and the French 
populations, and the subsequent Treaty of Lisbon, show how the 
integration process is both alive and a source of sociopolitical activ-
ity within member states. !eories pointing to how economic con-
cerns may affect the mood of public opinion and the policymaking 
process of governmental elites may shed light on the mechanisms 
underpinning phenomena such as the outcome of the French and 
Dutch referenda, or the overall process of European enlargement 
to the east and southeast. !e mechanism I have highlighted em-
phasizes how economic concerns may prompt further integration. 
In the French and Dutch cases it is possible that economic concerns 
may have lead to a restrained integration, or that economic concerns 
were absent, and thus the French and the Dutch saw no point in 
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restraining their countries’ sovereignty with an additional constitu-
tional treaty. !us, the convergence of the economy, the strength of 
public opinion, and the integration process, may help us solve some 
of the puzzles that underpin the reality of the European Union. 
Second, though this study is concerned with European inte-
gration, it is not unlikely that the argument advanced may provide 
insights into the functioning of other regional or global economic 
agreements. Regional organizations such as the North American 
Free Trade Organization, the Southern Common Market, the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations, or the World Trade Organi-
zation share many similarities with the EU, primarily economic in 
nature. Arguments pointing to how the overall level of the national 
economy and public opinion affect the policy outcomes may be ap-
plicable in these other contexts, too.  
 In its modest reach, the argument advanced in this paper has 
sought to provide further insight into the dynamics driving Eu-
ropean integration. As noted above, such insights may be applied 
elsewhere in the field of international relations and international 
political economy. Studying the past and future developments of 
the European integration process enables us to understand how 
and why states approach or shy away from Europe and the ideal 
behind it. But the endeavor enables us to reach beyond this in an 
effort to understand the international system and the factors that 
lead to cooperation—and sometimes conflict—among states. 
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